Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword by Andrew Bamford

Author:Andrew Bamford
Language: eng
Format: azw3
ISBN: 9780806143439
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
Published: 2013-05-01T04:00:00+00:00

Source: Figures refer to months since arrival in the peninsula; data largely derived from McGuigan, “Origin of Wellington’s Peninsular Army,” 39–70; and Oman, Wellington’s Army, 343–373.

The need to acclimatize these newer divisions, and build up their strength, explains their limited commitment to serious combat prior to 1812. Wellington’s deployment of his army at Fuentes de Oñoro makes this need particularly explicit, with the three new divisions out on the extremities of the line and the tested First, Third, and Light Divisions holding the vulnerable center. Although this deployment did not save the Seventh Division from heavy fighting as a result of Masséna’s flank attack, its intention is plain. In like fashion, the newer divisions were largely held back from the horrors of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and the Fifth and Sixth Divisions would only receive their real baptism of fire at Salamanca.64 Only from 1813 did matters appreciably change; after the reorganizations of the previous winter, the distribution of veteran and untried regiments across the army was as balanced as it would ever be, and the distinction between new and old divisions less marked. By this stage of the war, it also needs to be understood that the value of the monthly experience figures used here begins to deteriorate as many of the longest serving units had by now absorbed substantial drafts and transfers of manpower. Conversely, many of the nominally inexperienced first battalions had in fact taken in a core of veterans from departing junior battalions. Accordingly, the qualitative discrepancy implied by these figures may overstate the case a little.

One could well argue that a reorganization to create this state of affairs might ideally have been implemented earlier, but this argument begs the question of at what other point the strategic situation would have permitted a large-scale overhaul. As it was, a rearrangement of some brigades when the Fifth and Sixth Divisions were created, and minor changes thereafter, created a system that was workable for the campaigning of 1810–12 but that favored the senior divisions and in turn forced a greater reliance on them. Later, with time available, larger changes enabled a more balanced organization to be implemented. The structural development of the divisional system should therefore be read as being a steady progression toward an ultimate organizational goal, which had largely been achieved by the commencement of the march out of Portugal that would lead to Vitoria and ultimately to Toulouse.

The slow evolution of the system of command and control that has been outlined above was somewhat unusual for the era, where divisional assignments increasingly remained unchanged for years on end in most continental armies, most obviously that of France. This slow growth also had an effect on the choices of commanders for higher formations in the peninsula, complicated by the fact that the few officers who possessed the requisite experience in 1809 were unable to serve as they were senior to Wellesley. In the long term, the knock-on effect of this lack of senior

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